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The Extraterritorial Effect of Federal
Criminal Statutes: Offenses Directed at
Members of Congress
By MARK PETERSEN
Member of the Class of 1983
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 351 of the United States Criminal Code,' enacted in 1971,
prescribes penalties for offenses directed at members of Congress,
which include assault, killing, kidnapping, and attempted conspira-
cies.' This statute also provides for the use of federal agencies for in-
vestigating violations, but until 1982 it was silent as to a court's reach in
1. 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1971).
2. The statute in pertinent part reads as follows:
(a) Whoever kills any individual who is a Member of Congress or a Member-of--
Congress-elect shall be punished as provided by Sections 1111 and 1112 of this title
[18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 1112].
(b) Whoever kidnaps any individual designated in subsection (a) of this section
shall be punished (1) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or (2) by
death or imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if death results to such
individual.
(c) Whoever attempts to kill or kidnap any individual designated in subsection
(a) of this section shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for
life.
(d) If two or more persons conspire to kill or kidnap any individual designated in
subsection (a) of this section and one or more of such persons do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy, each shall be punished (1) by imprisonment for any
term of years or for life, or (2) by death or imprisonment for any term of years or
for life, if death results to such individual.
(e) Whoever assaults any person designated in subsection (a) of this section shall
be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
if personal injury results, shall be fined not more than S10,000, or imprisoned for
not more than ten years, or both.
(f) If Federal investigative or prosecutive jurisdiction is asserted for a violation of
this section, such assertion shall suspend the exercise of jurisdiction by a State or
local authority, under any applicable State or local law, until Federal action is
terminated.
(g) Violations of this section shall be investigated by the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation. Assistance may be requested from any Federal, State, or local agency,
including the Army, Navy, and Air Force, any statute, rule, or regulation to the
contrary notwithstanding.
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asserting subject matter jurisdiction when invoked.3
The penal authority of a sovereign state is generally limited to acts
occurring within its territorial boundaries.' Situations arise, however,
when a nation will desire to assert its authority in criminal matters be-
yond its borders, even when the actor is a citizen of another country.5
This extension of the criminal laws of one sovereign to acts wholly or
partially taking place in another state will be appropriate only when
certain necessary prerequisites have been satisfied.6
In a world of increased terrorism and open hostility toward the
United States and its policies,7 an attack or assault on a member of
Congress travelling abroad is not an unlikely occurrence. As a repre-
sentative of the government of the United States, a member of Con-
gress is a particularly likely and vulnerable target, and a prima facie
violation of section 351 is easy to imagine.
In the case of United States v. Layton,8 Chief Judge Robert
Peckham concluded that the jurisdictional reach of section 351 could
be extended to acts committed outside the borders of the United States
"at least when the attack is by a United States citizen and when the
Congressman is acting in his or her official capacity." 9 The case in-
volved the killing of a United States congressman in a foreign country
by a United States citizen. In light of the aforementioned terrorism
and hostility, it seems appropriate now to extend the Layton facts and
ask an additional question. Would the federal courts of this country be
able to obtain jurisdiction if a member of Congress was attacked or
killed in another country by aforeign individual or group?10
3. Some federal statutes specify or indicate their intended jurisdictional reach. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 18 U.S.C. § 9 (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). In 1982 18 U.S.C. § 351 wag
amended to add such a provision.
4. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
5. See Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction--Criminal Law, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 346
(1972).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 21-30.
7. See e.g., San Francisco Chron., Oct. 1, 1981, at 1, col. 3; See also ittfra notes 102-04
and accompanying text.
8. 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
9. Id at 220. Defendant was charged, inter alia, in the death of Congressman Leo J.
Ryan at the Port Kaituma airport in Guyana on November 18, 1978. Layton moved for
dismissal of all counts on various grounds, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction be-
cause the events on which the charges were based took place outside the territorial limits of
the United States. The court held that subject matter jurisdiction was proper, and the mo-
tion was denied. The case, subsequently litigated, resulted in a mistrial.
10. The initial inquiry, of course, is whether the United States actually desires jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of the action. It is likely that the government would have a
[Vol, 6
Federal Criminal Statutes
This Note will examine this question with a view toward determin-
ing the extent to which section 351 can be extended extraterritorially,"
including a critique of the reasoning in Layton. Emphasizing the juris-
dictional principles of the law of nations, the author will conclude that
a federal court would be justified in asserting subject matter jurisdic-
tion over a foreign defendant who has violated section 351 outside of
the United States. 2
II. THE JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF UNITED
STATES CRIMINAL LAW
A. The Problem
Subject matter jurisdiction is ordinarily limited to territorial appli-
cation. 13 Sovereign states have authority over acts committed solely
within their borders. But in an ever-shrinking world, such a limited
notion of jurisdiction 14 is unrealistic and ignores the potential for con-
compelling desire for jurisdiction, especially if the offense was political in nature. For pur-
poses of this Note an affirmati'e answer will be assumed as to this initial question.
11. A scenario will be developed more fully throughout the text as necessary. The basic
assumption is of a section 351 violation outside of the United States, by a foreign individual
or group. A plausible situation might be the presence of a senator from the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee in Saudi Arabia, who is attacked by a foreign assassination team. The
same basic jurisdictional problem would arise if a lone German gunman, upset over United
States nuclear policy in Europe, were to assassinate (or attempt to kill) a member of Con-
gress in Germany. Some of the competing interests may be different in each of these situa-
tions, however, and certain international principles may or may not be applicable in each
case. These variations in analysis will be developed infra in the text.
12. Obtaining subject matter jurisdiction is but one step in a larger process. Other hur-
dies will have to be overcome, such as personal jurisdiction, extradition, concurrent jurisdic-
tion, and immunities. For an overall view of this process see Note, Bringing the Terrorist to
Jusic. A Domestic Law Approach, I1 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 71 (1978).
13. For purposes of this Note, "jurisdiction" will be used to mean a state's competence
under international law to prosecute and punish for crime. See Harvard Research in Inter-
national Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 435, 439 (Supp. July
1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research]. Another suitable definition of the term is
found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TilE UNITED
STATES § 6 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]: "'Jurisdiction,' as used in the Re-
statement of this Subject, means the capacity of a state under international law to prescribe
or to enforce a rule of law." For an analysis of the RESTATEmENT'S treatment of this subject
see Metzger, The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States: Bares and
Conflict of Jurisdiction, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 7 (1966).
14. The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 4 (Judgment of Sept. 7),
shows some of the various ways in which the term 'jurisdiction" is used. For a comment on
this aspect of the case see H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 810
(1968).
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current or conflicting jurisdiction.' 5 While such a narrow policy would
be conceptually easier to apply, the problems created would quickly
outnumber those avoided. Merely desiring jurisdiction over some par-
ticular act committed without the state, however, and being able to jus-
tify such jurisdiction as a matter of national sovereignty and
international law, are two different things.
A common theory in international law is that criminal authority
can generally be extended extraterritorially because of the sovereign
powers of all states, which are limited only by the rights of other states
within the world community. 16 Extraterritorial application, however,
will nearly always mean interfering with the territorial authority of an-
other country, 17 and therefore any international theory of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction is necessarily limited by the possibility of a valid
objection by another state.'
Notwithstanding this inherent limitation, the successful extraterri-
torial application of criminal law does occur. 19 Historically, the United
States has been reluctant to pursue such a course,2°' but the desire and
necessity to do so is likely to increase. In ascertaining the validity of
such an extraterritorial assertion, a federal judge must carefully ex-
amine the relevant facts of each case to see if the government has satis-
fied the requirements which are set forth in this Note.
B. The Requirements
For any valid exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, three require-
ments must be satisfied.2' It must first be established that Congress has
15. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (1979); see also
Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 MICH. L. REv. 238, 239 (1931).
16. See Empson, The Application of Criminal Law to Acts Committed Outside the Juars.
diction, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 32 (1967).
17. See Cook, The Application of the Criminal Law of a Country to Acts Conmitted by
Foreigners Outside the Jurisdiction, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 303, 306 (1934).
18. See George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICHI. L. REv. 609,
613 (1966).
19. The Lotus Case, supra note 14, is a famous early case involving the extraterritorial
application of criminal law and the resulting conffict. Proceedings were instituted in Turkey
following the collision of a Turkish collier and a French steamer on the high seas. The
French steamer entered a Turkish port, and the responsible French officers were tried and
convicted of manslaughter due to the death of eight Turkish citizens in the collision. After
France protested the action, the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that Tur-
key's action was consistent with the principles of international law, and allowed the convic-
tion to stand.
20. See infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
21. See Epstein, The Extraterritorial Reach of the Proposed Criminal Justice Re/arm Act
of 1975 - 5. 1, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 275 (1976).
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the authority to create penal legislation having extraterritorial effect. 2-
Second, the government must show that Congress intended a particular
statute to have effect beyond the borders of this country. Finally, it
must be determined that such an extension into the sovereign bounds
of another nation is permissible under one of the jurisdictional theories
of international law.
This three-step process was utilized in United States v. Cotten.23
The case involved the theft of government property, a violation of the
federal criminal code.24 The defendants were found guilty and on ap-
peal challenged the competency of the district court to hear this matter
because it occurred outside the territorial bounds of the United States.
In concluding that the extraterritorial extension of this federal criminal
statute was valid, the Ninth Circuit found that such an application was
constitutionally permissible, that it could be justified by a jurisdictional
principle of international law,2 and that Congress intended the statute
to have such an effect.2 6
The Layton court also found a valid assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction using this same basic approach.27 After rather quickly con-
cluding that proper congressional and international authority existed,
the court stated that the principal question before the court was one of
statutory interpretation.2 8 The court went on to carefully review the
applicable case law in this area, as well as some of the legislative his-
tory of section 351, and determined that it was reasonable to infer that
Congress intended this statute to apply wherever a violation might
occur.
2 9
A key element in the Layton court's holding was the nationality of
the defendant. "[T]he courts of the United States have repeatedly up-
22. Epstein, supra note 21, at 275, feels that this requirement is one or constitutional
authorization. This is not, however, a universally accepted articulation of this element. See
George, supra note 18, at 614-15. Epstein acknowledges the idea of "inherent authority,"
but places it within the general concept of constitutional authorization. Epstein, mipra note
21, at 280-81.
23. 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The case also involved an action for con-
spiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), but the court felt that there was no
problem with the extraterritorial applicability of this section, and confined its analysis to the
theft section.
25. Actually, the court found no need for explicit justification in this case, as no nation
was offended by or objected to the prosecution of these defendants by the United States
government.
26. 471 F.2d at 749-50.
27. 509 F. Supp. at 216.
28. Id
29. Id at 217-21.
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held the power of Congress to attach extraterritorial effect to its penal
statutes,particulary where they are being applied to citizens of the United
States, as is the case in this instance."3 0
When the actor is not a United States citizen, the validity of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction must be determined using the same form of
analysis found in Cotten and Layton. Therefore, a closer examination
of the three relevant criteria is in order.
1. Congressional Authority
In justifying an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it must first
be shown that Congress is authorized to so extend federal criminal law.
In other words, the court must decide whether the principles of interna-
tional law governing jurisdiction are available to the federal govern-
ment.31 This requirement also has taken the form of demonstrating
constitutional authorization for Congress to so act,32 but it is not clearly
settled that this is a constitutional question.
One line of authority in this area has emerged from Justice Suther-
land's holding in United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corporation.33
Sutherland wrote that the powers of external sovereignty of the United
States do not emanate from the Constitution, but were vested in the
collective colonies as a whole upon their separation from Great Brit-
ain.34 The reasoning continues that when this source of power is com-
bined with the "necessary and proper" clause,35 Congress can create
criminal legislation having extraterritorial effect if the foreign or do-
mestic interests of the United States so dictate.36 Although this theory
has provided justification for congressional authority in this area,37 the
doctrine has been greatly criticized. 38
A theory justifying extraterritorial jurisdiction that has met less
resistance is one that is based strictly on the Constitution. Congress has
been delegated broad powers by the Constitution, such as the power to
30. Id at 215 (emphasis added).
31. Empson, supra note 16, at 33.
32. Epstein, supra note 21, at 279-80.
33. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
34. Id at 316.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
36. Empson, supra note 16.
37. See United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), afd sub n.
Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
38. See, e.g., Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Suther-
land's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Comment, Federal Jurisdiction Over Crimes Connit-
tedAbroad by Aliens, 13 STAN. L. REv. 155 (1960).
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regulate commerce with foreign nations, the power to declare war, the
power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and the power to
define and punish felonies on the high seas and offenses against the law
of nations.3 9 Under this theory, these powers, when combined with the
"necessary and proper" clause,' provide Congress with the authority
to enact legislation having extraterritorial effect.4'
Although the constitutional theory of congressional authorization
apparently has more support,42 adopting either line of reasoning will
achieve the same result: Congress is justified in creating penal statutes
that can be extended extraterritorially. Therefore, the real initial in-
quiry as to any statute, including section 351, is whether Congress in-
tended the statute to have extraterritorial effect.43
2. Congressional Intent
This requirement focuses on whether Congress intended that the
particular law in question have extraterritorial effect. This question is
easily answered if the statute expressly states the extent to which it
should be applied. In the specific case of section 351, however, there
was formerly no facial indication of jurisdictional reach." Therefore,
if this statute was to be applied extraterritorially prior to 1982, congres-
sional intent to so extend would have to be inferred.
Common law countries historically have tended to emphasize judi-
cial competency based on territoriality4s and have largely restricted ju-
risdictional reaching to situations involving nationals.46 This doctrine
was satisfactory for the United States during its early years of isolation-
ism, but has become less viable as the country has developed into an
international power.47 American courts have remained reluctant, how-
ever, to give extraterritorial effect to criminal legislation unless that in-
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 18.
41. George, supra note 18, at 616. See also Empson, supra note 16, at 34.
42. See Levitan, supra note 38. See also Comment, supra note 38. Both authors feel
that Justice Sutherland's theory in Curtiss-Vright is historically deficient.
43. George, supra note 18, at 616.
44. See supra note 2 for the full text of section 351 as enacted in 1971. Subsection (i)
was added to section 351 in 1982, providing that there is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the
acts prohibited by the section.
45. See Note, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction-Crminal Law, 13 HARV. INt'L LJ. 346, 347
(1972).
46. Even in the area of nationality jurisdiction, however, common law countries have
restricted this more than civil law countries. See Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 522.
47. Note, supra note 45, at 347-48.
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tent is clearly indicated on the face of the statute.48 Thus, Justice
Holmes indicated in American Banana Company v. United Fruit Com-
pany49 that there is a presumption that, if the statute is not clear on its
face, its effect will be limited to the borders of this nation."0
This principle of statutory construction is similarly reflected in sec-
tion 38 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations,-' which limits
the reach of legislation to acts occurring or taking effect within United
States territory "unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the stat-
ute." 2 The reporter's notes to this section show, however, that in some
instances there may be room to infer such intent when it is not clearly
indicated within the statute. This exception to the normally strict rule
of interpretation has been used by courts when there was no indication
as to jurisdictional reach, but failing to allow extraterritorial effect
would defeat the clear purpose of the legislation. 3
Such an exception was made in United States v. Bowman, 4 the
first Supreme Court decision to prescribe such a rule of construction.
The Court, faced with a violation of a federal criminal statute occur-
ring on the high seas, addressed the question ofjurisdiction. Admitting
the presumption against extraterritorial application when Congress has
not included this in the statute, Chief Justice Taft went on to say that
such a rule regarding jurisdiction should not apply to criminal statutes
that are not "logically dependent" on the location of the violation. 5 If
these types of laws are not given extraterritorial effect, their usefulness
would be severely limited, leaving a gap of unreachable violations sim-
ply because they occurred outside the boundaries of the United States.
"In such cases, Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific
provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and for-
eign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the
offense.",5
6
Although the rule in Bowman has not completely abrogated the
reluctance toward extraterritorial extensions, American courts have
had little difficulty invoking this rule when they felt the statute war-
48. See Chase, Aspects of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in Anglo.Anterican Prac-
tice, 11 INT'L LAW. 555, 558 (1977).
49. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
50. Id at 357.
51. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13.
52. Id § 38, at 107.
53. Chase, supra note 48, at 558.
54. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
55. Id at 98.
56. Id
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ranted such a result.57 Judge Peckham stated in Layton that the .Bow-
man analysis has been applied "in every subsequent case where the
issue has arisen."58 The Layton decision then applied the Bowman rule
and concluded that section 351 was intended to have extraterritorial
effect, at least where the actor was a United States citizen. 9
This Note is specifically considering a situation where the act oc-
curs outside of the United States, and the actor is a citizen of a foreign
country. This difference in the nationality of the defendant is unlikely,
however, to alter the result of a finding that Congress intended section
351 to protect its members within or without the United States. The act
to which this statute applies is not of a type logically dependent on the
locality of the violation60 or the nationality of the violator. An attack
upon a congressman or woman could reasonably be viewed as an ac-
tion against the security of the United States government, and the Bow-
man analysis would validate an inference of congressional intent of
extraterritoriality in such a situation.6 t
Another factor to be considered when interpreting section 351 for
legislative intent is the type of harm Congress meant to prevent.62
Considering the legislative history of this statute, it is evident that Con-
gress was not only concerned with the lives of people elected as legisla-
tors of the United States, but also with the functioning and security of
the federal government.63 This concern is not dependent on the nation-
ality of the violator or the location of the act.
Thus, it seems not only appropriate but also logical to infer that
Congress intended this statute to have effect irrespective of the borders
of the United States or the citizenship of the defendant, and this was so
even before section 351 explicitly allowed extraterritorial application.
Criminal legislation concerned with conduct that would be injurious to
57. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973).
58. 509 F. Supp. at 217.
59. Id at 220-21. At the time ofthis decision, section 351 had not been amended to add
subsection (i) regarding extraterritoriality.
60. United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936
(1973).
61. See Note, supra note 45, at 350.
62. See Empson, supra note 16, at 35.
63. See 116 CONG. REc. 35655 (1970). During the floor debate before passage of 18
U.S.C. § 351, Senator Byrd of West Virginia stated, "This legislation is needed to protect
representative democracy. Passage would help to guarantee the right of any Member of
Congress to fulfill his constitutional duties and responsibilities as an elected official of our
country." Id
19831
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the government is particularly susceptible to this type of inference.64 If
the nationality of the actor is to be a significant factor in an attempt to
obtain extraterritorial jurisdiction over an act in violation of section
351, this factor will come into play upon the application of the princi-
ples of jurisdiction of the law of nations.
3. International Law
The third and final requirement for justifying an extension of pe-
nal law extraterritorially is finding an accepted principle of interna-
tional law that condones such action under a particular set of facts.
The understanding of existing principles and their application will be
crucial to international acceptance of a nation's desire and competence
to try a foreign defendant for conduct outside its borders.
The fundamental principle of international jurisdiction is founded
on territoriality; states have a right to jurisdiction over events occurring
within their borders.65 In some situations, however, international law
acknowledges the right to extend criminal law beyond the state's bor-
ders.66 This extension must find its validity in a rule or principle of
international treaty or customary law.67
The law of nations has recognized five general principles of crimi-
nal jurisdiction upon which states have relied for extraterritorial asser-
tions.68 These five principles are: the territorial principle; the
nationality principle; the protective principle; the universality principle;
and the passive personality principle. 69 Each of these principles will be
64. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73-74 (1941).
65. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
66. See Note, supra note 45, at 346.
67. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreignersfor Treason and Offenser Against
the Safety of the State Committed Upon Foreign Territory, 19 U. Pirr. L. REv. 567, 584
(1958). The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), supra note 14, at 166, indicates in its discussion of the
international principles ofjurisdiction that the adoption of any or all of the accepted bases is
discretionary with each state.
68. See Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 445. See also Ri.STATEMENT, stpra note
13, §§ 10-19; Empson, supra note 16, at 35-36; Epstein, supra note 21, at 282.
Harvard Research, supra note 13, is perhaps the most authoritative source on the sub-
ject. The research effort was organized in 1927 by Professor Manley 0. Hudson at the
Harvard Law School, in relation to efforts by the League of Nations to codify international
law. A number of draft conventions were prepared on various subjects, including the Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, which was subsequently published in a
supplemental volume of the American Journal ofInternational Law in 1935. For informa-
tion concerning the Harvard Research project see Kenny, Manley 0. Hudson and the
Harvard Research in International Law 1927-1940, 11 INT'L LAW. 319 (1977).
69. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 445.
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briefly examined now before considering the extraterritorial applica-
tion of section 351.
The Territorial Principle. This is the starting point for any discus-
sion of international jurisdiction.7" The principle provides jurisdiction
based on the location of the offense, a concept universally recognized.7 '
Thus, jurisdiction over conduct within a forum state is acknowledged
regardless of the nationality of the actor.72 For the factual situation
assumed in this Note, the territorial principle is by definition not
applicable.
An extention of this most basic premise is the "objective territo-
rial" principle.73 This "sub-principle" encompasses crimes initiated in
one state, but producing "unintended effects within the jurisdiction of
another [state]."'74 This subpart of territorial jurisdiction has been in-
terpreted to mean that the offender is constructively present within the
forum state, and therefore the territorial principle is applicable.75 It is
conceivable that a violation of section 351 by a foreign citizen not phys-
ically within the borders of the United States could come within the
meaning of the objective territorial principle, a possibility that will be
developed later in this Note.76
The Nationality Princile. This universally accepted principle pro-
vides that a country has criminal jurisdiction over its citizens, regard-
less of their particular location.7 ' The basic and most commonly
asserted rationale for this proposition is the duty of allegiance owed to
the state by its nationals."8 The fact that a nation's exercise of jurisdic-
tion over its nationals is not generally a matter of concern to other sov-
ereigns lends further justification to this argument.'9
The nationality principle, although universally recognized, is not
70. See L BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 298.
71. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 480. See also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at
300.
72. See George, supra note 18, at 613.
73. See Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction Following Forcible Abduction"
A. New Israeli Precedent in International Law, 72 MicH. L. REv. 1087, 1089 (1974).
74. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 488.
75. Cook, supra note 17, at 312-13.
76. See infra notes 107-128 and acompanying text. For a comment on the recent use of
this principle, see Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction-Mfere Intent to Violate Criminal Statute
is Sufficient to Maintain Jurisdiction Under the Objective Territorial Princile, 16 TEx. INT'L
LJ. 149 (1981).
77. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 519.
78. Chase, supra note 48, at 557.
79. See Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 519.
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uniformly applied by all states.80 Common law countries such as the
United States and England tend to limit the scope of this principle
more narrowly than other countries,8" and the variation throughout all
nations is extensive. 2 These internal limitations and preferences are in
part due to the potential problems accompanying the use of this princi-
ple, such as double jeopardy and dual nationality. 3
Because this Note examines a situation in which the nationality of
the defendant is different than that of the forum state, this principle
will play no part in the analysis of the reach of section 351.
The Protective Principle. This principle provides a basis for juris-
diction over acts committed abroad which threaten the "security, integ-
rity or independence" of the forum state.84 This broadly encompasses
many acts of a political nature, but jurisdiction over immigration,85
currency, or economic crimes has also been justified by the protective
principle.8 6
This principle has also been invoked to provide extraterritorial ju-
risdiction over crimes impairing some interest which the forum state
feels a desire to protect.8 7 This would seem to be a workable proposi-
tion so long as the interests involved were something more than hazy or
abstract ideas, but interpretation and definition by individual states are
likely to vary,88 and the number of jurisdictional problems will likely
be proportional to the scope of these differences.
It is possible that an act of aggression toward a member of Con-
gress while abroad, committed by a foreign individual or group, could
fall within the intended scope of this principle. Indeed, such a finding
might well be essential to a valid extension of section 351 in such a
situation, 9 and therefore this basis will be examined more carefully
infra.
The Passive Personality Principle. This principle condones extra-
80. See Epstein, supra note 21, at 284-85.
81. Chase, supra note 48, at 558.
82. For a comparison of various states' applications of the nationality principle see
Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 522-31.
83. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 303.
84. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 543.
85. See Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S, 948
(1961).
86. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 303-04.
87. George, supra note 18, at 613.
88. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 304.
89. See infra notes 129-159 and accompanying text.
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territorial jurisdiction where the victim of the offense is a citizen of the
forum state. Jurisdiction based on this principle is not universally ac-
knowledged, and is the least acceptable of the five bases within interna-
tional law.90 This principle, however, may be unnecessary. This is
reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Lawp of the
United States, which has specifically rejected the passive personality
rationale for asserting jurisdiction.9'
Regardless of the potential lack of need for it, the passive person-
ality principle cannot be said to be universally invalid, and so must not
be neglected in any analysis where its application would be appropri-
ate. Because the scope of this Note is at least within the limits encom-
passed by the passive personality principle, its application will be
considered.
The Universality Principle. This principle provides that the state
apprehending the person committing the offense shall normally have
subject matter jurisdiction when the crime is of such a nature as to be
deemed to violate the interests of all sovereigns and offend notions of
international public policy.92 Crimes falling within this principle have
included piracy, slavery, narcotics trafficking, and hijacking,93 but the
principle has been termed "universal" only for the offense of piracy; as
to other crimes it has been called merely a basis of auxiliary
competence.94
The Layton decision did not mention the universality principle as
a possible source of jurisdiction for that crime. This may have been
because of the definition of the principle,9" or because of an attitude
that murder is not the type of offense meant to be covered by this basis.
Killing, however, in the form of terrorism, has been suggested as possi-
bly being within the universality principle.96 Depending upon the spe-
cific facts of an offense, the intent of the actors, and the definition of
terms such as "terrorism," it is conceivable that a section 351 violation
would be an appropriate situation in which to base jurisdiction on this
doctrine, and thus it will be considered.
It is evident now that international law will condone the assertion
90. See Epstein, supra note 21, at 289.
91. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 30(2), at 86.
92. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 304.
93. Id See also Epstein, supra note 21, at 289.
94. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 445.
95. The court referred to this principle as providing "jurisdiction for certain crimes
where custody of the offender is sufficient." 509 F. Supp. at 215.
96. See L BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 304.
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of extraterritorial jurisdiction in certain instances. For a violation of
section 351 by a foreign citizen in a foreign nation, the ability of a
federal court to assert jurisdiction over the offense will depend on a
finding that one or more of the principles of international law regard-
ing jurisdiction has been satisfied.97 The remainder of this Note will
examine the principles which might apply in such a situation" to deter-
mine if an extraterritorial extension of section 351 would be valid.
III. APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PRINCIPLES
The remainder of this Note will be devoted to a discussion and
analysis of the relevant international principles of subject matter juris-
diction, using the Layton decision as a starting point. This Note is con-
cerned with a factual situation very similar to that in Layton, with one
critical difference. In Layton, the defendant was a citizen of the United
States, a fact the court found significant. 99 The analysis herein is based
on a scenario in which the section 351 violation is by an actor who is
not a United States citizen.
Foreign travel by members of Congress is both frequent and ex-
tensive, due in large part to the increased role of the federal legislature
in all aspects of foreign affairs."° It was reported that in 1980 con-
gressmen and women took a total of 442 trips to locations outside of the
United States, to nearly every corner of the globe.101 By reason of their
elected position, these people represented this nation and its govern-
ment wherever they went.
International terrorism has also greatly increased in recent
years.'0 2 At a time when United States policies and actions have
sparked dissatisfaction and protest overseas, it is conceivable that any
symbol of those policies, such as a member of Congress, might be
97. It has already been shown that Congress is authorized to enact legislation with ex-
traterritorial effect, and that it is proper to infer they meant to do so when 18 U.S.C. § 351
was passed. See supra text accompanying notes 31-64.
98. As previously noted, the strict territorial and nationality principles are not applica-
ble for purposes of this Note. The assumption here is that the offense occurs beyond the
borders of the United States and is committed by a foreign national.
99. 509 F. Supp. at 215, 216, 220.
100. Id at 219.
101. See 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1541-61 (1981).
102. See generally B. JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM-A NEW MODE Or CoN-
FLICT (1975); Evans, Perspectives on International Terrorism, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 151
(1980).
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targeted by an individual or group for a terrorist attack.103 This is cer-
tainly true of diplomats who have increasingly become the targets of
terrorist attacks."° A scenario involving a member of Congress, travel-
ling in Europe and the subject of a terrorist attack, falls squarely within
the bounds of section 351. It is likely that the United States would
desire to assert jurisdiction over such an act.
It has already been shown that Congress has the authority to ex-
tend jurisdiction with respect to section 351,105 and that it was reason-
able to infer congressional intent, before it was explicitly granted, to
apply this statute extraterritorially.1°6 The third requirement, however,
must still be met. Assuming a violation of section 351 by a foreign
national outside of this country, does an assertion of jurisdiction by the
United States fall within one or more of the relevant principles of inter-
national law previously enumerated?
A. The Objective Territorial Principle
As previously shown, this principle "establishes the jurisdiction of
the State to prosecute and punish for crime commenced without the
State but consummated within its territory." °10 7 It is considered an ex-
tension or subpart of the territorial principle, 0 8 and has been adopted
in both common law and civil law countries."' 9
This principle was acknowledged by the United States Supreme
Court in Strassheim v. Daily,"0 when Justice Holmes stated: "Acts
done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing det-
rimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the
harm as if he had been present at the effect. . ... III Although
Strassheim involved jurisdiction between two states of the Union, this
103. The term "terrorism" is not easy to define. What some would view as terrorism,
others might call common criminality, and still others warfare orjustified political acts. For
information on these problems and some of the common elements of terrorism see Bouthoul.
D§fnitions of Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND WORLD SECURITY (D. Carl-
ton & C. Schaerf ed. 1975) (a paper presented to the Fifth Course of the International
School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts). For purposes of this Note, terrorism
will be used generally to mean acts of violence motivated by social and/or political con-
cers, against individuals or groups because of their status as symbols of some opponent.
104. Evans, supra note 102, at 152-53.
105. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
107. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 487-88.
108. Note, supra note 73, at 1089.
109. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 488.
110. 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
111. Id at 285.
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language was relied on in Ford v. United States,"1u a case where foreign
nationals were prosecuted in the United States for violating federal
prohibition laws.
Although the United States has based subject matter jurisdiction
on this principle, some confusion has arisen concerning the effect that
the offense must have within the forum state. Must the effect be in the
form of direct physical consequences"I3 or simply the impairment of an
interest about which the state has some legitimate right to be con-
cerned?1 4 In striving to maintain jurisdictional exercises based on ter-
ritoriality, states have apparently extended the "objective territorial"
principle to the point that it is very similar to the protective principle.
Indeed, it has been noted that the gap between these two bases of juris-
diction is an extremely narrow one.' 15
In United States v. Pizzarusso ,116 however, the Second Circuit very
carefully distinguished the protective principle from the objective terri-
torial principle. The court said that for a valid exercise of the objective
territorial principle some actual effect must occur within the prescrib-
ing nation, while merely a "potentially adverse effect" on the security
or functioning of the government will satisfy the protective principle. 117
The court also noted that other courts in the United States have failed
to properly recognize the distinction between these two principles.' " 8
Commentators have also criticized the blurring of these two juris-
dictional principles. Professor George feels that the objective territorial
principle should only be invoked when the violation includes some
"observable act or event" within the forum state which "produces iden-
tifiable harm."1 9 This idea of a "direct harm" requirement for the ob-
jective territorial principle, as opposed to an "indirect harm" which
may provide jurisdiction under the protective principle, has been fa-
vored by other writers as well.' 20
The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations recognizes both an
112. 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
113. See Chase, supra note 48, at 564.
114. See George, supra note 18, at 618.
115. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 494.
116. 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968).
117. Id at 10-11 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 33
commentary, at 93 (1965)).
118. Id at 11 (citing Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 948 (1961)).
119. George, supra note 18, at 618.
120. See Empson, supra note 16, at 35.
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objective territorial basis and a protective principle for jurisdiction,'
but does not indicate any overlap or confusion between the two. The
reporter's notes do indicate a tendency of the United States to rely on
the territorial basis for jurisdiction when possible,' " lending credence
to the notion that the objective territorial principle has been stretched
into the area properly covered by the protective principle. The territo-
rial jurisdiction provision of the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime indicates that some part or element of the crime must
take place within the forum state for this basis to suffice.ti2 This would
coincide with the "direct harm" requirement discussed above.
In the Layton case the court stated that both the protective princi-
ple and the objective territorial principle were applicable as bases for
extraterritorial jurisdiction.1 24 The underlying facts supporting the
court's assertion based on the objective territorial principle are absent,
however, suggesting the possibility that the court may have extended
121. REsTATEMENT, supra note 13, §§ 18, 32. Section 18, Jurisdiction to Prescribe with
Respect to Effect Within Territory reads as follows:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if
either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a
crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems,
or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the
rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct
and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not
inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have
reasonably developed legal systems.
Section 33, Protective Principle, reads as follows:
(I) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as a state or the operation
of its governmental functions, provided the conduct is generally recognized as a
crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
(2) Conduct referred to in Subsection (I) includes in particular the counterfeiting
of the state's seals and currency, and the falsification of its official documents.
Id § 18.
122. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, at 93.
123. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 480. Article 3, Territorial Jurisdiction, reads as
follows:
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed in whole or in
part within its territory.
This jurisdiction extends to
(a) Any participation outside its territory in a crime committed in whole or
in part within its territory, and
(b) Any attempt outside its territory to commit a crime in whole or in part
within its territory.
Id
124. 509 F. Supp. at 216.
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this provision past its intended bounds. This appears to be similar to
the analysis which the Pizzarusso court was critical of.'25
In the scenario suggested by this Note, the entire offense occurs
outside of the territory of the United States. There is no "direct physi-
cal consequence"' 126 or "direct harm"'t27 that could be shown to exist
within the forum state. If harm within the United States was intended
as part of the act, it would be in the form of a threat to the security or
operation of the government by the attack on one of its members or
possibly a threat to the tranquility and integrity of the nation by terror-
ist action directed at one of its governing bodies. Neither of these
threats is the sort of identifiable harm that should be evidenced for an
assertion of objective territorial jurisdiction.128
Extending the objective territorial principle to the action contem-
plated by this Note is unnecessary jurisdictional fiction. Other bases in
international law are better equipped to deal with this situation, as will
be shown in the following sections. In a world made smaller and more
compact by modern transportation and communication, to find juris-
diction based at least in part on older notions of strict territoriality (in
situations where no required element of the crime occurs in the forum
state) is to construct a jurisdictional foundation inherently defective
and necessarily more vulnerable to attack.
B. The Protective Principle
The Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime for-
mulated this basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction in article seven:
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside
125. 388 F.2d at 10-11. Judge Medina stated:
However, the objective territorial principle is quite distinct from the protective
theory. Under the latter, all the elements of the crime occur in the foreign country
and jurisdiction exists because these actions have a "potentially adverse effect"
upon security or governmental functions, Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations
Law, Comment to Section 33 at p. 93, and there need not be any actual effect in the
country as would be required under the objective territorial principle. Courts have
often failed to perceive this distinction. Thus, the Ninth Circuit, in upholding a
conviction under a factual situation similar to the one in the instant case, relied on
the protective theory, but still felt constrained to say that jurisdiction rested par-
tially on the adverse effect produced as a result of the alien's entry into the United
States. The Ninth Circuit also cited Strassheim and Aluminum ComFat y of
America as support for its decision. With all due deference to our brothers of the
Ninth Circuit, however, we think this reliance is unwarranted.
Id
126. See supra note 113.
127. See supra note 117.
128. George, supra note 18, at 618.
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its territory by an alien against the security, territorial integrity or
political independence of that State, provided that the act or omis-
sion which constitutes the crime was not committed in exercise of a
liberty guaranteed the alien by the law of the place where it was
committed.
129
This statement of the protective or security principle is articulated very
similarly by the Restatement (Second) ofForeign Relations.130 This jus-
tification for extraterritorial jurisdiction has been adopted, at least in
theory, by a majority of nations.13 1
The rationale for this principle has historically rested on the fol-
lowing three premises: a sovereign right of self-defense; the inherent
right of every state to determine the scope of its criminal laws; and the
right of a country within the law of nations to be internally secure from
foreign interference or influence. 32 This third justification seems the
most reasonable and soundly based. 33 What is important to under-
stand, however, is that this principle is based on the nature of the harm
rather than the locus of the act.
The protective principle for obtaining jurisdiction has been ap-
plied in cases of politically hostile acts by foreign nationals in another
country, 134 as well as in cases of currency and economic offenses. 135 It
has been cited as the most common basis for the legislative extension of
criminal laws beyond state borders. 36 Actual use of the protective
principle, however, has been infrequent, 37 especially by the United
States.' 38  Furthermore, the principle has been extensively criticized.
As articulated by the Restatement and the Draft Convention, the prin-
ciple has been said to be vague and easily confused with other bases,
such as the objective territorial principle. 139 Additionally, due to the
shift of emphasis in international law from the state to the individ-
ual,"4 and because of the human emotions often involved in crimes
covered by this basis, it has been suggested that the usefulness of the
129. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 543.
130. See supra note 121.
131. See L BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 303.
132. Garcia-Mora, supra note 67, at 584-88.
133. Id
134. See Note, supra note 73.
135. L BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 303-04.
136. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 543.
137. See Note, supra note 73, at 1094-95.
138. See J. BRiERLY, THE LAW OF NATiONs 299-301 (1963).
139. See George, supra note 18, at 617-20.
140. See, e-g., Note, The Domestic Application ofInternational Human Rights Law Evolv-
ing the Species, 5 HAsTINGS IN'L & COMP. L. Rv. 161, 165-90 (1981).
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protective principle has passed. 141
An extension of the "vagueness" criticism involves the wide juris-
dictional latitude available to states utilizing the protective principle. 42
Much discretion is left to the individual nation to determine what its
interests are or may be, and when these interests might be impaired or
threatened. Thus, this principle has been viewed as having the poten-
tial for arbitrary application, with few if any guidelines for use' 43
"The protective principle of criminal jurisdiction . . . apparently
recognises no objective limits.'" n
Despite these apparent problems and some question as to whether
the United States has actually accepted the protective principle, it
would appear that this country has recognized such a basis in some
situations. 45 Jurisdiction has been based on this principle many times
for violations of federal law relating to entry into the United States by
foreign nationals. 146 In Rocha v. United States,147 six foreign nationals
were accused of defrauding the United States by engaging in a sham
marriage scheme in an attempt to enter the country as immigrants in a
preferred status. Following their conviction in the district court, the
defendants appealed, alleging, inter alia, that the court was not compe-
tent to hear the matter because the events took place outside the bor-
ders of this country. The court of appeals stated that the defendants'
acts were directed "against the sovereignty of the United States," and
when such acts occur abroad, they fall within the scope of the protec-
tive principle. 148
In the Layton case, Judge Peckham determined that the protective
principle was available to the court as well as the objective territorial
principle. 149 Again, however, no underlying facts or principled reason-
ing is evident in the opinion. The court simply stated that "[tihe al-
leged crimes certainly had a potentially adverse effect upon the security
or governmental functions of the nation, thereby providing the basis
141. Garcia-Mora, supra note 67, at 587-88.
142. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 304.
143. Sarkar, The Proper Law of Crime in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL LAW 50, 70-71 (G.O.W. Mueller & E.M. Wise ed. 1965).
144. Id at 70.
145. See Epstein, supra note 21, at 288.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936
(1968) (foreign national falsifying statements on visa application); United States v. Archer,
51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1943) (false statements made in application for a nonimnligrant
visa).
147. 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
148. Id at 548-49. For a comment on this case see 62 COLUM. L. REV. 371 (1962).
149. 509 F. Supp. at 216.
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for jurisdiction under the protective principle."' 51 Such an unsup-
ported finding directly exposes the use of this basis for jurisdiction to
the criticisms previously noted. 51 However obvious it may appear that
the situation is on all fours with the criteria of the protective principle,
only careful illumination of the facts and effects will prevent interna-
tional legal condemnation and potentially damaging worldwide public
opinion.
In the scenario assumed for this Note, the individual or group vio-
lating section 351 has acted specifically because the victim is a repre-
sentative of the United States government. An act of aggression by a
terrorist group or a disenchanted individual clearly violates the federal
statute. Like the offense in Layton, it seems this situation squares di-
rectly with the rationale behind the protective principle. Before so con-
cluding, however, the specific facts of the individual case should be
examined carefully, and any doubts concerning the observation or in-
terpretation of such an act as threatening or impairing the security of
this country should be resolved.
Proper invocation of the protective principle occurs when the ex-
traterritorial act threatens or impairs national interests, such as state
integrity, security, or other social or governmental concerns.' 52 Terror-
ism would seem to be such a threat. Such acts are nearly always in-
tended as broad social or political statements and as such can hardly be
thought to be contained within the limited scope of simple domestic
territorial law.'53 "A]cts of terrorism are usually performed in abnor-
mal circumstances and are intended to alarm and horrify certain re-
sponsible leaders or groups . . . creating a situation of collective
danger .. . ." '5 Thus the protective principle can be viewed as an
appropriate mechanism to secure extraterritorial jurisdiction over these
types of offenses. 155
Assuming now that the victim of the act is a member of Congress,
it can again be concluded that the protective principle would apply in
most situations. 56 An attack against such a person because of the of-
150. Id
151. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
152. See Empson, supra note 16, at 37.
153. DeSchutter, Problems of Jurisdiction in the International Control and Repression of
Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CIMs 379-80 (M.C. Bassiouni
ed. 1975).
154. 1d
155. Id at 382.
156. If the criminal act were simply a robbery, for instance, with no political or social
motivations, the offense would not fail within the bounds of the protective principle, and a
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fice they hold is undoubtedly an act directed at the sovereignty of the
United States. 57 Congressmen and women are essential elements of
the government, creators as well as symbols of United States domestic
and foreign policy, and their safety and protection are obviously im-
portant.1 8 The United States could reasonably view an act of violence
against one of these members as a potential threat to its very existence,
and asserting jurisdiction based on the protective principle in such an
instance would be proper and consistent with international law. 59
court should properly so conclude. In such a case it is unlikely that the United States would
have a compelling interest in obtaining jurisdiction, especially since local domestic law
would surely be adequate.
157. See Epstein, supra note 21, at 290.
158. Id
159. See Feinberg, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Proposed Federal Criminal Code,
72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 385, 393 (1981).
For 15 years extensive changes to Title 18 have been considered and proposed, and
presently there are bills before both the House and Senate for a new federal criminal code.
A major change embodied in both the House and Senate versions of this code is the delinea-
tion of when extraterritorial jurisdiction is to apply. This would be accomplished by specify-
ing certain situations, applicable to any provision of the code, when jurisdiction should be
asserted extraterritorially. Section 204 of S.1722, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the United
States, reads as follows:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, or by treaty or other interna-
tional agreement, an offense is committed within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
the United States if it is committed outside the general or special jurisdiction of the
United States and-
(a) the offense is a crime of violence and the victim or intended victim is-
I. a United States official; or
2. a federal public servant outside the United States for the purpose of perform-
ing his official duties;
(b) the offense is treason or sabotage against the United States;
(c) the offense consists of-
1. counterfeiting or forgery of, or uttering of a counterfeited or forged copy of, or
issuing without authority, a seal, currency, security, instrument of credit, stamp,
passport, or public document that is or that purports to be issued by the United
States;
2. perjury or false swearing in a federal official proceeding;
3. making a false statement in a federal government matter or a federal govern-
ment record;
4. bribery or graft involving a federal public servant;
5. fraud against the United States or theft of property in which the United States
has an interest;
6. impersonation of a federal public servant; or
7. any obstruction or impairment of a federal government function, if committed
by a national or resident of the United States;
(d) the offense consists of the manufacture or distribution, as defined in 21 U.S.C.
802, of narcotics or other drugs for import into, or eventual sale or distribution
within, the United States;
(e) the offense consists of entry of persons or property into the United States;
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This showing of facts and effects is requisite to use of the protec-
tive principle as a basis for jurisdiction. If, however, this premise for
extraterritorial jurisdiction is abolished as an internationally recog-
nized principle due to the criticisms stated previously, competency over
a section 351 offense would have to be justified on some other basis,
such as the passive personality or universality principles.
C. The Passive Personality Principle
This principle is intended to provide jurisdiction to a nation when
one of its citizens is the victim of a crime, and is premised on the duty
of the state to protect its nationals.16 0  In the situation postulated for
this Note, the passive personality or "nationality of the victim" princi-
ple is, on its face, applicable. This principle is not, however, univer-
sally accepted, 6' and is thought to be the least justifiable criterion on
which to base an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 62
Although a state generally has a duty to protect its citizens, ex-
tending this protection to nationals abroad may be stretching this duty
too far.163 In some cases, the foreign actor will be unaware of the fo-
rum state's laws, and little if any connection will exist between the
(f) the offense consists of possessing an explosive in a United States Government
building;
(g) the offense is committed in whole or in part within the United States, the
accused participates outside the United States, and there exists a substantial inter-
est in federal investigation or prosecution; the provisions of section 205Cc) apply
also to this subsection;
(h) the offense constitutes an attempt, a conspiracy, or a solicitation to commit a
crime within the United States;
(i) the offense is committed by a federal public servant, other than a member of
the armed forces who is subject to court-martial jurisdiction for the offense at the
time he is charged with the offense, who is outside the United States because of his
official duties; or by a member of a federal public servant's household who is resid-
ing abroad because of such public servant's official duties; or by a person accompa-
nying the military forces of the United States;
(j) the offense is committed by or against a national of the United States at a
place outside the jurisdiction of any nation; or
(k) the offense is comprehended by the generic terms of, and is committed under
circumstances specified by, a treaty or other international agreement, to which the
United States is a party, that provides for, or requires the United States to provide
for, federal jurisdiction over such offense.
S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). For information concerning the proposed federal crim-
inal code and extraterritorial jurisdiction see Feinberg, svpra; Epstein, svpra note 21; and
Note, supra note 45.
160. Epstein, supra note 21, at 289.
161. See Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 445.
162. L BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 303.
163. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 138, at 302.
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two. 164 Such concerns probably contributed to the rejection of this
principle by the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations.16 5
The Permanent Court of International Justice was faced with a
claim of jurisdiction based on the passive personality principle in the
case of the S.S. "Lotus,"'16 6 but the court approved jurisdiction on other
grounds.' 67 Apparently no case in the United States has based jurisdic-
tion on this principle, although courts have listed it along with the
other international principles when discussing extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion.' 68 Furthermore, it has been said that no federal law "appears to
provide for jurisdiction based on the United States citizenship or the
official status (such as a consular employee) of an injured person."'169
The court in Layton stated that the passive personality principle
would support an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in that in-
stance, but discussed potential problems in using this basis for jurisdic-
tion.1 70 Referring to the Restatement, the court indicated that it was
questionable whether this principle, by itself, would be sufficient for
jurisdiction, but did not formally address the question because passive
personality was not the sole premise in this case. 17 In view of the criti-
cism and apparently subordinate status of this principle, 172 the Layton
court's fears were no doubt well founded.
In the scenario of a foreign actor beyond United States borders
164. See Epstein, supra note 21, at 289.
165. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, at 86. Section 30(2) reads: "A state does not have
jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct of an alien
outside its territory merely on the ground that the conduct affects one of its nationals." Id
166. The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), supra note 14. See supra note 19 for a discussion of
The Lotus Case.
167. Id
168. See e.g., Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub
nom. Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1967); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F.
Supp. 479, 487 (S.D. Cal. 1960), a.f'd sub nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
169. George, supra note 18, at 621.
170. 509 F. Supp. at 216 n.5.
Passive personality jurisdiction is one of the bases for extra-territorial jurisdiction
which is cited in the case law without any suggestion that it should not be relied
upon by the courts. . . . Given that the assertion of passive personality jurisdic-
tion does not stand alone in this case as the sole basis for extra-territorial jurisdic-
tion under recognized principles of international law, the court need not address
the question of whether Congress could assert its jurisdiction over a crime merely
on the basis of the nationality of the victim.
Id.
171. Id.
172. The passive personality principle has been referred to as "admittedly auxiliary in
character." Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 445.
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committing an offense encompassed by section 351, the passive person-
ality principle is facially applicable, but its questionable status as a
valid jurisdictional basis means that its use should be subject to close
scrutiny. If the assault on a member of Congress is a domestic crime,
such as a robbery without socio-political motivations, the need for the
United States to vindicate its authority would be far less compelling
and local law would likely protect United States interests. If, however,
the attack is of a terrorist nature, such a resolution might not be
adequate.
It has been suggested that the careful use of the passive personality
principle in situations involving terrorist attacks would be appropriate
and less subject to the general criticism of this basis.' 73 The principle
might combine well with the protective principle in such situations to
justify extraterritorial jurisdiction.'74 Given the unstable foundation of
the passive personality principle, and the section 351 scenario assumed
for this Note, however, other less questionable bases of jurisdiction
would suffice.' 75 The fact of the nationality of the victim, instead of
providing an independent basis of jurisdiction, would simply be a
favorable element tending to add validity to assertions based on other
principles. 176
D. The Universality Principle
This principle provides a basis for jurisdiction premised upon cus-
tody of the offender, when the acts committed are of such a nature as to
be universally condemned. The universality principle is acknowledged
by all states with respect to piracy, 17 7 but has had scattered and non-
uniform application for some other offenses, most notably war
crimes. 178 The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations specifically
articulates piracy as a basis for jurisdiction, ' 79 and the reporter's notes
suggest the possibility of universal treatment for such crimes as slave
trade, drug, and prostitute trafficking as well as war crimes.'t 0
Although use of the universality principle is not favored in the
United States, it has been invoked in certain instances.'"' The Layton
173. Note, supra note 12, at 79.
174. Id
175. See Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 445.
176. See Empson, supra note 16, at 33 n.10.
177. Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 445.
178. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 304-05; Note, supra note 73, at 1091.
179. REsTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 34.
180. .d at 97.
181. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 304.
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court mentioned it as an acceptable basis for jurisdiction in interna-
tional law, but in no way relied upon this premise for its holding. 182
This was probably due to the limited application this basis has had
with respect to the types of acts universally condemned. In some in-
stances involving a section 351 violation, however, reliance on this
principle might well be valid. As the universality basis continues to
develop, it may play an expanded role in extraterritorial jurisdiction for
some types of crimes, such as terrorism, possibly filling voids created
due to the reluctance of states to make use of the often criticized pas-
sive personality and protective principles.18 3
The Harvard Research Draft Convention formulated two articles
based on a theory of universality. The first is specifically for acts of
piracy,184 but the second would allow jurisdiction over foreign nation-
als for unspecified offenses in certain carefully defined situations. 185
Thus, an alien offender whose extradition to the state where the act
occurred has been refused could properly be tried in the state of cus-
tody if the act was punishable in both nations. t86 This gives rise to the
possibility that in certain situations involving a violation of section 351,
182. 509 F. Supp. at 215-16.
183. See Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 579.
184. Id. at 563 (art. 9).
185. Id at 573. Article 10, Universality-Other Crimes, states:
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its territory by
an alien, other than the crimes mentioned in Articles 6, 7, 8, and 9, as follows:
(a) When committed in a place not subject to its authority but subject to the au-
thority of another State, if the act or omission which constitutes the crime is also an
offence by the law of the place where it was committed, if surrender of the alien for
prosecution has been offered to such other State or States and the offer remains
unaccepted, and if prosecution is not barred by lapse of time under the law of the
place where the crime was committed. The penalty imposed shall in no case be
more severe than the penalty prescribed for the same act or omission by the law of
the place where the crime was committed.
(b) When committed in a place not subject to the authority of any State, if the act
or omission which constitutes the crime is also an offence by the law of a State of
which the alien is a national, if surrender of the alien for prosecution has been
offered to the State or States of which he is a national and the offer remains unac-
cepted, and if prosecution is not barred by lapse of time under the law of a State of
which the alien is a national. The penalty imposed shall in no case be more severe
than the penalty prescribed for the same act or omission by the law of a State of
which the alien is a national.
(c) When committed in a place not subject to the authority of any State, if the
crime was committed to the injury of the State assuming jurisdiction, or of one of
its nationals, or of a corporation or juristic person having its national character.
(d) When committed in a place not subject to the authority of any State and the
alien is not a national of any State.
Id
186. See id at 582.
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understanding and cooperation could result in United States jurisdic-
tion on the basis of this formulation of the universality principle.
If use of the universality principle expands, some terrorist acts
might come under the coverage of this basis. Such terrorism may often
be the type of threat to the foundation of the world community upon
which the principle of universality is founded. 8 7 Terrorism has been
likened to piracy,1 88 and terrorist acts in the form of airplane hijacking
are clearly a form of air piracy. To date, however, there appears to
have been little, if any, use of this principle in relation to terrorism
except in limited and non-exclusive instances,8 9 and to base jurisdic-
tion solely on universality would be presently inappropriate.19
Notwithstanding this lack of customary use, the possibility of
claiming the universality principle for jurisdiction over acts of terror-
ism has been viewed approvingly.' 9' As the effective control and pros-
ecution of such acts becomes increasingly difficult, the criticisms and
shortcomings of the other international principles might well give way
to an expanded notion of universality jurisdiction. A terrorist act
against a member of Congress abroad would be an appropriate situa-
tion for use of an expanded version of this principle if the United States
were to gain custody of the actors. In such a case, a sympathetic world
community might condone such an assertion, making it unnecessary to
premise jurisdiction upon less firm ground, such as the protective prin-
ciple or nationality of the victim.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has shown that Congress is authorized to create penal
legislation that extends beyond the borders of the United States. Fur-
thermore, it is permissible to infer congressional intent to extend juris-
diction even when extraterritorial reach is not indicated on the face of
the statute. In the specific case of section 351, such an inference, prior
to 1982, would have been appropriate. Therefore, whether the United
States as a member of the world community may properly assert the
criminal authority embodied in section 351 within the sovereign
bounds of other nations will depend upon the specific facts of a viola-
187. See 2 M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: JURISDICTION AND COOPERATION 32-33 (1973).
188. R. HINGORANI, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 245-47 (1979).
189. See Note, supra note 73, at 1098.
190. id at 1099-1100.
191. See DeSchutter, supra note 153, at 383, 388.
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tion and the applicability of the accepted international principles of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
In the framework of a reasonable and potential scenario, an of-
fense violating section 351 committed by a foreign national outside of
the United States could result in a strong desire by this country to ob-
tain jurisdiction over the crime. Assuming the basic set of facts used in
this Note, such an act would fall within the scope of one or more of the
accepted international principles. The protective principle would apply
most clearly if the attack has political motivations or is undertaken
against a member of Congress not as an individual, but as a symbol.
Beyond the harm to the individual, 192 the government of the United
States is harmed and threatened in a way the protective principle is
designed to cover. The United States would certainly be justified in
invoking this principle to validate an extraterritorial extension of its
law. The protective principle has been criticized, however, and its
standing in the international legal community is somewhat dubious.
Using the "objective territorial" principle would be as clearly in-
appropriate as the protective principle is appropriate. Certainly the
scenario assumed for this Note would result in some harmful effect in
the United States, but this effect is not the type envisioned by this ex-
pansion of the territorial basis. The situation where an individual fires
a gun in one country, striking a person in another country, illustrates
the effect that the "objective territorial" principle is designed to
cover.193 When the effect of the act is a more indirect harm to the
security or structural elements of a state, asserting the "objective terri-
torial" principle would simply confuse this basis with the protective
principle. Such an attempt could hardly add validity to the asserting
government's actions.
The passive personality principle appears to be directly applicable,
but it too has been criticized and is invoked upon facts and circum-
stances far less fundamental and compelling than any of the other in-
ternational bases. If the act in question were one of terrorism, the
universality principle might be used to justify the extraterritorial juris-
diction of section 351. This would represent an expansion of this basis,
however, and though it is possibly a valid and necessary expansion, it is
not one that to date is widely accepted.
Another factor was apparently important, although not decisive, in
192. Such a criminal act would certainly be encompassed by the penal laws of the state
where the act occurs.
193. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 138, at 300.
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United States v. Layton. The court, in finding that extraterritorial juris-
diction was appropriate, felt that the "official nature of Congressman
Ryan's trip to Guyana" lent support to such a result.1 94 It is difficult to
imagine, however, why this fact should be persuasive. The official or
unofficial nature of the presence of a congressman or woman in an-
other country does not alter the intent or motivation behind the act, the
nationality of the victim, nor the harm to the government of the United
States. 195 The application of the principles of international jurisdiction
would not change. If, for instance, the offense was a terrorist act, politi-
cally motivated and directed at the member of Congress because of his
or her position in the government, the fact that the member was vaca-
tioning would have little or no bearing on a determination that the pro-
tective or universality principles were applicable.
Another point the Layton court seemed to imply was that the prin-
ciples of international jurisdiction are cumulative, and satisfying more
than one basis adds validity to the government's assertion. 196 Thus, in
a footnote, the court indicated that the passive personality principle
might not be sufficient standing alone but in this case it was not the sole
basis, and therefore not a problem.' 97 Some scholars have loosely
ranked the various principles, and indicate that a state's position may
be strengthened by use of multiple bases.' 98 It is important, however,
that a state base its jurisdictional assertion on the most persuasive prin-
ciple available to it. 199 The principles often seem to overlap, however,
and the occurrence of a situation where two or more bases validly ap-
ply would no doubt make the assertion more reasonable.2 "o As previ-
ously noted, although justification may not ultimately rest upon an
auxiliary base, such as the passive personality principle, the fact of the
victim's nationality may be persuasive for a successful assertion.2° t
With respect to the scenario hypothesized for this Note, it is evi-
dent that one or more of the principles of international criminal juris-
diction are applicable. Therefore, the United States conceivably could
194. 509 F. Supp. at 220.
195. It is possible, however, that the official nature of such a trip could be evidence of the
motivation for the action, and therefore such a determination might be appropriate. But it is
the motivation, or intended harm or effect, which is important to a finding of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
196. 509 F. Supp. at 216.
197. Id at 216 n.5.
198. See Harvard Research, supra note 13, at 445.
199. R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DoMESTic COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
32 (1964).
200. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 305-06.
201. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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assert its penal authority beyond its own borders in such an instance.
But the use of the international principles is not a simple mechanical or
automatic operation carried out blindly when application would be
convenient. Prior to the matter ever coming before a federal district
court the government must cautiously decide whether it should assert
jurisdiction in a particular case.202
If the act is a crime in both the United States and the country
where it occurs, that country will have territorial jurisdiction over the
offense. An attempt by the United States to assert its penal authority
would give rise to a number of problems. Some of the potential trouble
areas include concurrent or conflicting jurisdiction, double jeopardy,
loss of evidence, and inability to locate or secure witnesses. 20 3
Problems may also arise concerning international agreements, extradi-
tion, and immunity.2 4 In light of these problems, it is incumbent upon
a nation, when considering whether to seek jurisdiction beyond its own
borders, to consider each case on its own facts, examining both the pol-
icies and effects involved.20 5
Assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction must be undertaken care-
fully, with substantial consideration given to the potential conflicts and
the possibility of upsetting world order.206 Applying the international
principles in any less careful manner would not only be intellectually
shallow, but potentially very dangerous. Tremendous foresight, con-
sideration of all possible alternatives, and near-altruistic self-control
may be necessary to prevent confrontation or the breakdown of rela-
tions. Ultimately, proper and sufficient prosecution of the crime and
punishment for the offense is the goal, and cooperation may be the key
to ensuring this, regardless of the location of trial.
202. See Feinberg, supra note 159, at 390.
203. See Chase, supra note 48, at 558.
204. For general information regarding extradition see W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LISSITZYN &
R. PUGH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 491-95 (1969); W. BiStilO, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 471-75 (1962). See also Research in International Law, Extradition, 29
AM. J. INT'L L. 15 (Supp. Jan. & Apr. 1935). For comment on recent cases involving extra-
dition and the problem of the political crimes exception see Note, American Courts andMod-
ern Terrorism: The Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. 617 (1981);
Carbonneau, Terrorist Acts-Crimes or Political Infractions? An Appralsal a/Recent French
Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 265 (1980); Note, Political Offenses in
Extradition: Time/or JudicialAbstention, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 131 (1981).
205. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 14, at 800.
206. See R. FALK, supra note 199, at 39; Epstein, supra note 21, at 299-302, See also
Klein & Wilkes, United Nations Draft Statutefor an International Criminal Court: An Aterl-
can Evaluation, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 526 (G.O.W. Mueller & E, Wise ed,
1965).
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